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Abstract
Young highly educated workers developed in the 70’s and 80’s a preference
for working in larger cities. As a consequence highly educated young workers
in 1990 were over-represented in cities, in spite of the lower wage premium
they earned for working in crowded metropolitan areas if compared to their
older colleagues. This can be an equilibrium only if young workers enjoy
some benefits in cities and are willing to pay for them. In our model, the
extra-benefit of working in cities is given by a dynamic externality of human
capital. Agglomerations of educated workers arise endogenously, as workers
are attracted to dense areas, which improve their learning from others. If the
skills accumulated in cities are easily transferable, it is efficient for educated
people to work in dense areas while they are young and move to less dense
areas when they become mature workers. Once the ”learning period” is over,
workers are attracted to smaller and less dense locations where there is less
competition from other skilled workers and housing price is lower. Our model
explains why young workers were attracted into large cities in the 70’s and
80’s: this was the era of increased flexibility, of the success of versatility
rather than specificity of skills. Small firms thrived, and therefore the
transferability of skills increased. The model also gives an account of why,
once they accumulated their human capital, some of the workers moved to
smaller towns.
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Learning by doing and learning from others are important determinants of work-
ers’ skills and productivity and at least on the theoretical ground they could be
responsible for sustained productivity growth (Arrow [3], Romer [32] and Lucas
[27]). Working in a local environment which promotes interactions with skilled
people generates valuable learning opportunities for young workers. Cities, and
among them, those with denser employment and larger concentration of edu-
cated workers, provide such an environment and young workers are attracted
to them. ”Great are the advantages which people, following the same trade,
get from near neighborhood to one another” Marshall1 says, and Lucas2 asks:
”what can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not
for being near other people?”.
This ”preference” for large cities, though, does not apply to all workers
homogeneously. We argue, using stylized evidence and reference to previous
work that in the 90’s, young workers were more willing to pay the high rents
in denser urban areas than their older colleagues. They also received a smaller
wage premium, for working in crowded cities, than their older colleagues. We
claim that the reason for this is that working in dense cities during the early
phases of their career beneﬁts workers allowing accumulation of valuable skills.
Workers are willing to forego part of their real wage for this ”investment”. The
early years of a worker’s career are those during which she acquires most of her
professional human capital. Once that period is over, the attractiveness of a
crowded city, with high rents and high competition on the job, decreases, and
(at least some) older workers move towards less crowded working environments.
Large and dense cities, while expensive and overcrowded, are laboratories for
new skills and they should experience a ﬂow of incoming young workers, and of
outgoing older ones.
In the present paper we develop a general equilibrium overlapping generation
model which explains the stylized facts about learning, wages and location of
young and old workers. Two elements are crucial in understanding the interac-
tion between learning, concentration of young educated workers and migration
of older (mature) workers. These two factors are the ”intensity” of local learn-
ing and the ”transferability” of skills. We analyze the aggregate equilibrium
behavior in a model with two locations, as these two characteristics change.
The increase of electronically mediated contacts across workers represents an
intensiﬁcation of the learning potential in cities if face to face contacts (as Gas-
par and Glaeser [13] argue) are complements to electronic ones. This would
increase the density of people in cities, but if what they learn cannot be easily
transferred, there would not be a tendency of older workers to move out. The
”speciﬁcity” of human capital will somehow reduce the lifetime beneﬁts from
learning in dense cities. Only a tendency towards increased transferability of
skills generated by increased standardization of processes and tasks requiring
high skills, induces the second eﬀect of out-migration of older workers.
1The quote is from ”Principles of Economics”, A. Marshall 1890
2The quote is from Lucas[26].
2The seventies and eighties were the period of increased ﬂexibility in the U.S.
labor market, small ﬁrms thrived as large ﬁrms went through a slowdown (Piore
and Sabel [30]), ﬂexibility and portability of skills, as well as the importance of
learning became key ingredients of skilled workers success. We think that the
emphasis on versatility of skills, plus increasingly standardized technical and
computational languages and the introduction of the computers (1980) increased
the transferability of human capital across locations. Such was the engine that
brought concentration of young educated in cities as they could learn from
interactions there, and retain the higher productivity while moving out of cities
when older.
Our model shows that from an undiﬀerentiated distribution of skills between
two locations, as the intensity of local learning increases, an endogenous ten-
dency towards the concentration of skills arises. One location becomes more
populated, with higher density of educated workers, allowing intense learning,
and exhibiting higher price of housing. If skills are strongly ”location” speciﬁc,
and most of them would be lost in moving, then people will not move during
their life. Cities in steady state diﬀer in density and learning potentialities
but not in the fraction of young and old. What generates the concentration of
young workers is the increased transferability of skills: People learn in larger
cities while young and move to less crowded cities, to enjoy less competition
and lower housing prices, when old. Large, costly, skill-intensive cities become
in steady state the place where learning takes place for educated workers, early
in their career. Smaller, more livable, inexpensive cities attract older workers
oﬀering them higher real wages.
We simulate our stylized model using parameters compatible with observed
statistics for US cities in the 70’s and in the 90’s. We ﬁnd, interestingly, that
as transferability of skills increases above values close to those suggested by
empirical evidence for the 80’s the equilibrium of the economy shifts from a
situation with no migration to one in which young people work in denser areas
and migrate to less dense areas when old.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some stylized facts on
experience premia, concentration of young educated workers in U.S. cities for
1970 and 1990. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on learning and local
externalities in cities. In Section 4 we develop the model and its equilibrium
conditions are deﬁned. In Section 5 the equilibrium in steady state is described
with the help of some simulations analyzing the eﬀect of a change in the ”local
learning intensity” and in the ”appropriability of human capital”. Section 6
discusses the results and summarizes the existing evidence on internal migrations
of workers and human capital speciﬁcity.
2 Stylized Facts on Productivity and Learning
The literature has pointed out the existence, in the 90’s of two interesting rela-
tionships. The ﬁrst is that in urban areas, and particularly in large cities, the
share of college educated workers is larger than outside urban areas (Table 1,
3Glaeser and Mare [15]). Cities are, therefore, concentration of highly educated
workers. The second is that urban areas, and especially large cities, seem to
attract a disproportionately large fraction of young educated workers, rather
than of educated workers in general (Table 1, Glaeser [14]).
Less attention has been devoted to the analysis of the evolution, over the
last decades, of skills in cities and to the analysis of the premium to experience,
paid in cities and outside of them. This section documents that, while the
concentration of highly educated workers in cities exists at least since the 70’s,
the disproportionate presence of young is a phenomenon beginning only later,
and perceivable in 1990. On the contrary both in 1970 and 1990 the experience
premium paid to educated workers was signiﬁcantly larger in urban areas, in
particular in larger cities, as compared to non-urban areas or smaller cities.
Highly educated workers crowd larger cities since the 70’s, but young educated
overcrowd cities since the 90’s in spite of the smaller premium that they receive
to live there, compared to their older colleagues.
We document the above-mentioned facts, using three diﬀerent possibilities
in the comparison between more dense and less dense areas. Table 1 reports
some summary statistics from US census data in year 1970 and 1990 relative
to the comparison between Urban and Non-urban areas, and between seven
Megalopolis3 and the other main metropolitan areas. Table 2, on the other hand
considers only 167 main Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s), excluding the
megalopolis, and analyzes correlation of size, skills and premia across them for
1970 and 1990.
3We deﬁne Megalopolis those Metropolitan Areas with more than two millions employ-
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Table 1: Stylized Facts for Urban Areas and Large Cities
The ﬁrst four columns show the comparison between Megalopolis and other
cities, and between Urban and non -urban areas, for the year 1990, while the
following four columns do the same for the year 1970. First, let me point out
the similarities between 1970 and 1990 statistics. From the ﬁrst row, we notice
that in both years, the denser areas exhibit larger share of college graduates in
the work-force. In terms of experience composition of the overall work-force,
the dense areas do not appear to have any larger share of young workers (second
row). If tastes of workers are similar between skilled and unskilled, this says that
it is not a preference of young people in general, to generate the concentration
of young skilled in cities. Finally the experience premium of skilled workers,
calculated only for white males with college education or more, (ﬁfth row) shows
that in both years there is a tendency of denser areas to have larger premia.
This tendency is not noticeable in the comparison between Megalopolis and
other cities in 1970, though. This means also that, taking the urban-non urban
comparison, young workers worked in cities rather than in the non urban areas,
for a much smaller premium than older workers (third and fourth row). While
5in 1990 old workers requested a premium of four dollars per hour (4.5 in 1970)
to work in cities, young workers only required a premium of two dollars per
hour (2.2 in 1970) to work in cities. If we think that the wage diﬀerentials
oﬀset, on average, diﬀerent housing costs between the two locations, then this
means that young workers accepted to work in cities at lower real wages than
they would have got outside. Notice, that between 1970 and 1990, the data
also show the well known overall increase in the share of college graduates and
t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h es h a r eo fy o u n g ,d u et ot h ee n t r a n c ei nt h em a r k e to ft h e
baby-boomers. The well known increase in experience premium between 1970
and 1990 is shown across locations. Diﬀerent tendencies between 1970 and 1990
statistics are portrayed in the last three rows. If we decompose the share of
workers with college degree or higher, between young (less than twenty years
of experience) and old (more than twenty years of experience), we notice that
while in the 70’s the two groups are in same ratio between more dense and less
dense areas, in the 90’s the group of young is much larger, relative to the old,
in denser areas. If any diﬀerence existed in 1970, it was of a larger Young to
Old ratio of educated outside denser areas, while in 1990 it is rather strong the





























































Table 2: Correlations across SMSA
6The same stylized facts, also emerge from the cross sectional analysis of 167
MSA for which we have comparable data in 1970 and 1990, from the US census.
Table 2 reports some elasticities, obtained by OLS regression of a dependent
variable on the logarithm of employment relative to the year 1990 and 1970.
Such coeﬃcients capture how variables are linearly correlated to the size of an
MSA. The ﬁrst and fourth row conﬁrm the similarity between 1970 and 1990
in terms of skill concentration in large cities and experience premia in large
cities. An increase by 3.6% (by 1% in 1970) in the share of college graduates
is associated to a doubling of employment across cities, while the experience
premium increases by 2% for each doubling of employment in 1990 (by 7% in
1970). On the other hand, while in 1990 the diﬀerence between the share of
college educated young and old workers was positively and very signiﬁcantly
correlated with employment (second row) in 1970 it did not depend on it. In
order to show that the higher concentration of educated young workers in cities
is not driven by family-size we have repeated the test including only single male
head of families (third row). Older worker may prefer smaller cities as they have
larger families and housing is too expensive in cities. Considering single white
male workers the correlation between share of young workers and city size is
still positive and very signiﬁcant. This says that in 1990 the diﬀerence in shares
of young and old educated workers was positively associated with large cities,
while in 1970 no such correlation existed. This in spite of the fact (documented
in the last two rows) that in 1990 young workers were paid a premium of only
6.8% of their hourly wage per each doubling in size of the city, while older
workers were paid a premium of close to 9% of their wage for each doubling.
To summarize, the model we propose should reconcile the following stylized
facts:
1) Larger cities have been (at least) since 1970 concentration of educated
workers and such a tendency is still present in 1990.
2) In 1970 educated workers receive larger experience premia in larger cities
and they still do in 1990.
3) Only in 1990 larger cities have become more attractive for educated young
workers than for educated older workers
4) In 1970 and 1990 young educated workers were willing to work in large
cities for a wage premium lower than that required by their older colleagues.
3 Related Literature on Local Learning
The present paper analyzes the role of learning from interactions and learning
from others in determining the location decisions of workers, and their produc-
tivity. We assume the existence of a dynamic externality of human capital at
the city level, which has been analyzed in the literature in several ways, and
some evidence of its existence has been provided. For the innovative activity
(Audretsch and Feldman [2], Foster and Rosenzweig [11] and Jaﬀe et al. [18]),
for the accumulation of personal skills (Glaeser [14], Glaeser and Mare [15])
and for urban growth (Eaton and Eckstein [10], Glaeser et al.[16], Simon [33])
7evidence supports the thesis that local interactions and therefore concentration
of educated people are beneﬁcial to learning. While rigorous eﬀorts to quantify
externalities of human capital on productivity have provided more controversial
results (Moretti[28] and Rauch [31] ﬁnd sizeable eﬀects while Acemoglu and
Angrist [1] and Ciccone and Peri[7] do not) that work has focussed on static
externalities of human capital on productivity, rather than on dynamic learning
externalities which aﬀects accumulation of human capital. The present work
allows only dynamic externalities of human capital, namely externalities in the
process of accumulation of human capital itself, via experience on the job. We
rule out any externalities in production, whose existence has been empirically
denied by Ciccone and Peri[7], in the context of a production function compat-
ible with the one we use in this paper.
The paper also shares an interest with the literature on new technologies,
telecommunications and the future of cities. If enhanced and faster ways of
communication are potentially changing the role of cities, this does not mean
that they are making them ”obsolete”. As Gaspar and Glaeser [13] argue, the
role of cities as centers of information might actually be increased, if telecom-
munication complements, rather than substitutes, for face to face interactions.
Recently Leamer and Storper [25] have argued that, as information technologies
allow for easier diﬀusion of knowledge, they also increase the complexity and
time-dependence of productive activity. This is likely to make agglomerations
more important. The traditional role, emphasized by Jacobs [17], of cities as
ground for cross-fertilization of ideas, could become more and more important
as original knowledge becomes the most important input for production and
for accumulation of human capital. If new technologies allow for easy transfer-
ability of acquired skilled, so that workers could learn in some large cities and
then move to smaller ones, then the large metropolis of the new millennium
could ”specialize” in being the crowded and busy learning ﬁelds for young pro-
fessionals. Intense learning interactions plus transferability of processes and of
technical language give cities a comparative advantage in generating learning
for young skilled workers.
4A M o d e l o f T w o L o c a t i o n s
4.1 The Production Function
We consider an economy with two locations (could be city A and city B or a
city and its hinterland), two types of workers (denoted as highly educated H and
less educated L) and two generations (denoted as young Y and old O). In each
period a new generation enters the labor market and at the end of each period
an old generation exits. The structure is that of an overlapping generation model
(OLG). Each person stays in the labor market for two consecutive periods, ﬁrst
as a young and then as an old. She contributes to the production of a tradable
homogeneous good and to the accumulation of skills of other workers. Each
highly educated worker is mobile between cities, and decides where to locate
8at the beginning of each period. Nevertheless, while at the beginning of her
Youth, she can choose the location at no cost, at the beginning of her Old age
if the worker decides to change city she has to pay a cost. This cost is the loss
of a fraction (θ) of the skills accumulated on job during the ﬁrst period. These
skills are at least in part location-speciﬁc. Less educated workers are assumed
for simplicity as non-mobile.
In the economy there are also unproductive house-owners, who collect rents
from the houses (land) they own, cons u m et h et r a d a b l eg o o da n dt h el a n d
services, and are not mobile between cities. They do not enter the labor market
and are introduced in the model in section 4.3, when considering the market for
housing (land). An homogeneous tradable good 4 the numeraire is produced in
each city using all types of labor in the way speciﬁed by the production function
(1) below. No physical capital is used in production5. Output of the tradable
































c = A,B 0 < γ < 1, Λ > 1
(1)
Ωt denotes total factor productivity at time t. we assume that it grows at
exogenous rate and, for simplicity, we set this rate to 0 and standardize the
level of Ωt to one. We are not interested in analyzing the aggregate growth
rate of productivity in the economy, but rather its relative level in diﬀerent
locations and the migration decisions of workers. The ﬁrst term in brackets
represents the contribution to production, in city c,o fl e s se d u c a t e dw o r k e r s
(Lc). Worker j’s supply of labor ljc is scaled up by its eﬀectiveness e
jc
L ,w h i c h
is a measure of skills accumulated on the job by less educated workers in city
c.w ea s s u m ep e r f e c ts u b s t i t u t a b i l i t yo fw o r k e r sw i t hd i ﬀerent experience levels.
The second term in brackets represents the contribution of highly educated
workers (Hc). Again, their personal supply of labor hjc is multiplied by their
eﬀectiveness e
jc
H. We allow for a skill biased technological component Λ which is
equal across cities and larger than one to capture the fact that highly educated
workers are more productive than less educated. This implies that the available
technology is equal across cities, and allows us to concentrate on the eﬀects of the
learning externality and on the concentration of skills that arises endogenously.
Consistently with the empirical evidence7 we assume the two types of labor to
be diﬀerent factors, with elasticity of substitution larger than one8.N o t i c et h a t
4We rule out, therefore, pecuniary externalities due to transport costs, in order to concen-
trate on dynamic learning externalities.
5As long as capital is mobile between cities none of the results obtained is aﬀected by this
simpliﬁcation.
6The subscrip t denoting calendar time, counts as one period the lenght of each period of
life for the agents.
7Katz and Murphy [24] estimate an elasticity between College and High School educated
workers equal to 1.4, Ciccone and Peri [8] estimate it to be around 3.5.
8Recall that in this case the elasticity of substitution between the two composite factors
9this implies that an increase in the productivity of highly educated (Λ)i n c r e a s e s
their demand.
We assume that each of the less educated workers L, supplies one unit of
labor. Due to the speciﬁcity of their human capital or due to moving costs,
less educated workers are not mobile between cities and their total number is
standardized to one in each city per each generation. Each of the more educated
workers H, supplies one unit of labor and the total number of workers in each
generation is standardized to one9.
With a slight abuse of notation we denote with hA
Y and hA
o the total number
of young and old highly educated workers in city A. Therefore hB
Y =( 1− hA
Y )
and hB
o =( 1− hA
o ) are the total number of young and old educated workers in
city B. As we allow for educated workers to move between their ﬁrst and second
period of life we allow for hA
Y 6= hA
o .We standardize the eﬀectiveness of workers,
when young, to one, and denote with ec
L and ec
H the eﬀectiveness of less and
more educated workers, respectively, when old. Total production in city c at
time t is:
Y c










γ c = A,B 0 < γ < 1( 2 )
Each factor, in equilibrium, is paid its marginal productivity. Wages of
the diﬀerent types of workers can be easily derived from (1). Before doing
that, though, we introduce the process of ”local learning”, which contains the
dynamic externality.
4.2 Dynamic externalities and Learning
We focus our attention on dynamic ”learning”. During their early years of
activity due to formal and informal interactions with other workers in the same
city workers build up their ”eﬀectiveness”. The interactions are thought as
face-to-face interactions, (or at least as face-to-face initiated interactions10)a n d
therefore require physical proximity, namely working in the same city. This
type of ”learning” is a pure externality , i.e. by-product of the interactions for
which none of the workers is compensated. The dynamic eﬀect on accumulation
of human capital depends on the total amount of skills working in the city.
More educated and more experienced co-workers help faster learning in young
workers.
The model does not analyze the eﬀect of learning on the long run growth of
productivity, pushing aside, in fact, the issue and assuming exogenous (and equal
to zero) long run growth of productivity. We believe that empirical evidence has
overwhelmingly rejected the idea that, over the last few decades, across regions
and cities in OECD countries, self-sustaining externalities have been conducive
is: 1
1−γ
9For simplicity we are assuming no population growth.
10Diﬀerently from Gaspar and Glaeser [13] here these interactions do not involve costs but
are by-products of working in the same city. Their caracteristics of being complementary to
electronic interactions still apply.
10to divergent growth. Be it because of decreasing returns to capital, or because of
diﬀusion of knowledge, we share with several authors11 the view that, within a
country, the distribution of relative per capita income in regions, and of relative
size and densities in cities, have moved around a balanced growth path. The
relative levels of productivity, wages, densities of workers and experience premia
in balanced growth path, on the other hand, is aﬀected by local externalities. Is
on these ”relative level” eﬀects of externalities that we concentrate our attention.
To capture the phenomenon of learning in a city, we use a function that
describes the accumulation of a worker’s eﬀectiveness. Accumulation depends
positively on the total skills in a city and takes place only when the worker is
young. For given personal characteristics, a worker who is in a city with higher
density of skills will increase more her eﬀectiveness. To keep things simple, we
assume that the eﬀect of city-skills on the accumulation of personal skills is
identical for more and less educated. Each agent accumulates human capital
(eﬀectiveness) as a Cobb-Douglas combination of the total amount of human
capital in each group of workers in the city. Interaction with diﬀerent group
of skills increases accumulation, due to a complementarity among skills in this
learning function. The evolution of the eﬀectiveness of agent j,w i t hs c h o o l i n g













t I = L,H, c = A,B (3)
This expression implies that the average young worker in city c, either highly
or less educated, accumulates eﬀectiveness over her initial level (one), as a func-
tion of the human capital for each group in the city12. Each group of co-workers,
interacting with a young worker, increases her eﬀectiveness. The contribution
of each group to the learning externality depends on its total skills (size of the
group times eﬀectiveness). These are combined in a Cobb- Douglas function
with elasticities reﬂecting the importance of a group in generating the external-
ity, and the function has constant return to scale, so that the return to three
factors is α1+α2+α3 < 113. We assume that the contribution to the externality
is stronger from highly educated than from less educated (α1 ≥ α3, α2 ≥ α3
and α1 + α2 ≥ 0.5) . In general we also assume that the contribution to the
externality is stronger from young educated than from old educated (α1 > α2)
in order to capture the fact that newly educated might incorporate more up-to
date skills. Therefore, the accumulation of skills depends on the average level
of human capital of each group, and on the number of highly educated, young
and old workers (hA
Y and hA
o ) relative to less educated (whose number is 1) in
the city.
11On Regional Convergence see Chapter 11 of the textbook Barro and Sala-i-Martin [4] and
references thereof, on stability in distribution of city-size see Eaton and Eckstein [10].
12W ec o u l de a s i l ya d dap o s i t i v et e r m( e), capturing common accumulation of skills, which
does not depend on the location.
13Remember that the amount of human capital of young, less educated is equal to one in
each city.
11φ > 0 is a parameter capturing the extent of learning. It can be thought
as a measure of the ability to learn from interactions or of the frequency of
interactions. Improvements in the technology for learning from interactions and
for intensifying face-to-face initiated interactions would increase this parameter.
In particular, if virtual interactions are complementary to face to face interac-
tions (as Gaspar and Glaeser [13] argue), Information Technology improvements
cause an increase in this parameter.
Given that the accumulation function of human capital is identical for more
(H)a n dl e s s( L) educated, assuming in each city the same initial conditions for
the two groups we have (ec
H)t =( ec
L)t = ec
t. Averaging expression (3) across
individual for each city , we obtain the following dynamic system that describes

























It is easy to ﬁnd the steady state of this dynamic system, setting to 0 the
left hand side of both equations (4) and (5). As α2 +α3 < 1, there is a unique,
globally stable steady state for eA
t and eB
t , once hA
Y ,h A
o reach constant values.
The values of accumulated eﬀectiveness (eA and eB) in steady state, in city A







Eﬀectiveness, accumulated during the early phase of one’s working life de-
pends, therefore, positively on the learning technology (φ)a n do nt h ed e n s i t y




4.3 Wages, Housing Prices and Interest Rate
I nt h er e s to ft h eP a p e rw ec o n c e n t r a t eo n the steady state equilibrium of the
economy. In this equilibrium the number of young and old educated workers in
a city is equal over time (although young workers in a city can be more or less
than old workers in that city implying migration during their life). Wages equal







(1−γ) (1 + ec)γ−1 (8)
14This is true if φ ≤ 1
α1+α2






























Notice that, because of the constant return to scale property, the sum of












Due to the assumed restriction on γ, the production function exhibits de-
creasing returns to educated workers alone. This means that, increasing their
relative supply in a city (hc
Y + hc
oec), decreases their return relative to the
wage of less educated16. The ”schooling premium” both for young and old
is: (wc
HY/wc











pression is increasing in Λ, and decreasing in hc
Y and hc
o. Finally, the accu-
mulated eﬀectiveness is responsible for the increase in wage of workers when
old. The ”experience premium”, for both highly and less educated, is in fact:
(wc
LO/wc
LY )= ( wc
HO/wc
HY)=ec.
In order to study the location decisions of the agents we want to capture in
a parsimonious way, the relevant incentives and costs to move into or out of a
city for the highly educated workers. On one hand, moving in a location with
many highly educated workers implies ani n c r e a s ei nl e a r n i n gw h e ny o u n g .O n
the other hand it means also an increase in competition and a decrease in wage
(due to decreasing returns) as well as higher price for housing. To account for
the price of housing, we assume that each worker consumes during each period
of life a composite bundle, G made of the Cobb-Douglas combination of the
tradable numeraire C and housing services from land T, whose price in city c is
pc




log(Gi)t+1 where Gt = Cδ
t T
t1−δ 0 < δ < 1, β ≥ 0.
(12)
β is the inter-temporal discount rate, which we assume equal for all workers
in both cities. Also, as we assumed zero aggregate growth, we also set the inter-
temporal discount β to 0. This is equivalent to a situation in which growth rate
and inter-temporal discount are positive but the ”magnifying” eﬀect for future
income due to growth, is balanced by the inter-temporal discount. we assume
the existence of a bond market countrywide whose interest rate, in terms of
16This is consistent with what found in Ciccone and Peri [7]
17Notice that, as Λ > 1 the wage of highly educated is always larger than the wage of less
educated.
13the numeraire is r. The rent for the housing services in city c, pc
T, is paid to
non working local land (house) owners, who spend all their income to maximize
their inter-temporal utility which is identical to (12). Without loss of generality
the amount of land (and of land-owners) is assumed to be the same in each
location and it is normalized to one. The total income of land-owners in city c
is, therefore, equal to pc
T.
Let’s denote with EI
J the total expenditure in steady state of a worker with
schooling we(= L,H)i np e r i o dJ (= Y,O) of her life. The optimal allocation
between C and T in each period implies that CI
J = δEI
J and TI
J =( 1− δ)EI
J.
The optimal inter-temporal allocation of expenditure between the two periods



























wherewIY and wIO are the wages for young and old workers with education
I (we have omitted all the superscript denoting the city; the above relations
hold for workers in both cities). The term in square brackets represents the
present discounted value of nominal lifetime income for a worker of schooling I.
We can calculate the total workers’ expenditure in each period, in steady
state, in city c,( Ec
tot), by adding the expenditure of each group of workers,
multiplied by the number of that type of workers in the city. In particular,

























The total expenditure of workers in the above expression (15), has two com-
ponents. The term (Y c)
(1−γ) is common to wages of all groups and depends on
total production in the city. The term in square brackets is the sum of the spe-
ciﬁc components of expenditures for each group. Within it (1 + ec
1+r)c a p t u r e s
the fact that for each group the present discounted value of lifetime income is
given by ﬁrst period wage income plus the second period income discounted at
rate 1
1+r. The second term within the ﬁrst square brackets, captures the speciﬁc
component of income for each of the four groups, multiplied by the share spent
in the period.
The value of pc
T is a function of Ec
tot, and can be obtained by equating the
total expenditure on land services of people living in city c to the total income
14accruing to land owners in the same city. Recall that the total quantity of land
is one and that each person (both workers and land-owners) spends a fraction
(1 − δ) of her total expenditure on housing services. Therefore:
(1 − δ)Ec






tot. The price of land in a city is proportional to
the total Expenditure of workers in the city. This is due to the fact that larger
expenditure on land services, whose supply is ﬁxed, generates an increase in
their price (a typical crowding eﬀect). The increase in price of land represents
a second channel, besides decreasing returns to skilled workers, through which
congestion eﬀects balance the beneﬁts of local human capital externalities. In
equilibrium the beneﬁts and the costs of increasing the density of highly edu-
cated in a city oﬀset exactly.
Let’s consider inter-temporal trade between cities and the determination of
the steady state interest rate. In order to do this we equate the total production
of the tradable good in the economy with its total consumption. Even if the
whole economy itself (made of the two locations) is an open economy, this
assumption implies that in steady state (long run) the equilibrium must be
sustainable. If the economy trades with the foreign market it cannot have a
systematic deﬁcit or surplus: the long run real interest rate should guarantee
balanced trade budget, on average. The equilibrium condition for r is therefore
obtained by equalizing total expenditure on the tradable good, made by workers
and land owners, to the total production of the good for the two cities. Each
group of workers spends a fraction δ of her income in the tradable good. Adding
the income of workers and land owners we get18:
EA
tot + EB
tot = Y A + Y B (17)
The above equation provides the equilibrium condition determining r for the
economy.
4.4 Location decision, density and migrations
4.4.1 Sub-game perfect stationary Nash Equilibrium
The ”natural” price index for each location in the economy is the price to pur-
chase one unit of the composite consumption bundle G. This index is speciﬁc
to each city, as the price of housing is diﬀerent across cities: pc = ζ(pc
T)1−δ =
κ(Ec
tot)1−δ,where ζ, κ are constants, independent from the location19.C o m p a r -
ison of real income between the two cities is crucial to determine the choice of
location for highly educated workers.
18The total expenditure in the tradable good for the whole economy is obtained by simpli-
fying the following expression: δEA
tot + δ 1−δ
δ EA
tot + δEB




(1−δ)(1−δ) ,κ = δ2δ−1
15Highly educated workers, are mobile in each period. We need, therefore, to
solve this problem backwards. Consider, without loss of generality, that A is
the location with high density of educated young workers (hA
Y > 0.5)20.T h e
advantage of working in A while young is that the worker beneﬁts from the
learning externality by increasing her future human capital. Such incentive to
stay in A, though, disappears at the beginning of the second period. In that
moment, being in A will only give the workers the disadvantages due to high
price of housing and high competition of skilled workers. Therefore, she will
move if the real income she will earn as an old worker in B, accounting for the
fact that part of her eﬀectiveness (θ ∈ (0,1)) will be lost, is higher than the real
income she will earn as old in A. Therefore old educated workers will also move
from A to B, driving down wages of old educated workers in B to the level which
makes them indiﬀerent between staying in A or moving to B. If θ is particularly
large, though, the cost of moving to B would be prohibitive and therefore all
workers who were in A as young will remain there as old as well. There is a
convenient way of representing the nominal wage that a worker, who worked
as young in city A would earn as old in B. From (10) and (11) we have that
wA
OH =( wA
YH)eA, therefore if the worker moves to B,l o o s i n gaf r a c t i o nθ of her
acquired human capital, his wage there would be:(wB
YH)[1+(1−θ)(eA−1)].For
simplicity we call RWA the real wage per unit of eﬃciency (also real wage




tot)1−δ and RWB the
real wage per unit of eﬃciency (or of a young educated worker) in location


















O and RWAeA = RWB[1 + (1 − θ)(eA − 1)] (19)
hA
O >h A
Y is never an equilibrium. In fact as hA
O >h A
Y > 0.5 this equilibrium
imply people migrating from B to A at the beginning of the second period. As
RWA <R W B it would not be rational (sub-game perfect) for any worker to do
this.
Given the above conditions for the second period how do highly educated
worker choose to locate in the ﬁrst period? The representative worker will move
to the city with high density of highly educated up to the point in which the
lifetime income from being there is equal to the lifetime income from being in
the less crowded city, anticipating the possible move to that city, once old. It
could be the case, though, for the self-reinforcing nature of the externalities that
is convenient for all young educated workers to locate in A. In this case we have
hA
Y = 1 while part of the workers will move away when old, just enough as to
make condition (19) hold.
20An identical symmetric reasoning applies when city B is the one with higher density of
young educated workers.
16The equilibrium condition, determining the relative number of young edu-
cated workers in each city, (hA
Y ,h B
Y =1−hA
Y ) is given therefore by the following
conditions. Lifetime real income (RI) and therefore utility for highly educated
workers in city A, a n di nc i t yB, is equated if both cities have some young
workers, while if all the young are concentrated in A then lifetime income in A
must be larger than in B. Formally 21:
hA




































Substituting into the above expressions the deﬁnition of real wages , collect-
ing terms on the left hand side we get the following expression for RIA − RIB:





























tot)1−δ capture the real wage of educated peo-
ple when young. They are decreasing in the intensity of educated workers
(hA
Y + hA
o eA) because of decreasing returns and crowding eﬀects. The terms
in brackets, on the other hand, capture the beneﬁts from increased accumu-
lation of skills. They are increasing in the density of highly educated. The
relative contribution of these two terms determines the existence of equilibria
with concentration of educated workers.
The equilibrium values in steady state for the model is given by the variables
(hA
Y ,h A
o ,e A,e B,r) which jointly solve the ﬁve equations (6), (7), (17), (18) or





o =0 .5 is always an equilibrium, satisfying the equilibrium
conditions (6), (7), (17), (18) and (20) at the interest rate r =0 . As we will see,
though, such equilibrium becomes unstable, as the intensity of local learning
φ grows above a critical value. In that case agglomeration of skilled workers
arises, as a consequence of local learning, and larger and more educated cities,
will be associated with faster learning.
21Ih a v es i m p l i ﬁed identical terms on both sides of the equality.
175 Equilibria
5.1 Stability: Interior and Corner Solutions
In this section we analyze potential equilibria as function of two key parameters
of the model: the intensity of local learning φ and the transferability of human
capital (1 − θ).
It is useful, to begin with the analysis of (RIA−RIB) described in equation
(22) as a function of hY
A, assuming that people live the whole life in the same
location. In this case hY
A = hO
A = hA. These equilibria are sustained by large θ
and hold as long as condition (18) holds. They represent only minor variation on
the usual ”agglomeration equilibria” described in several economic geography
models.
The point hA =0 .5, it is always a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium. Let’s
consider, without loss of generality, the evolution of real lifetime income diﬀer-
entials (RIA − RIB)a shA increases towards one. Two opposite eﬀects take
place: The ﬁrst is that the real wage in location A for young workers decreases,
due to decreasing returns to skills and to the increase in housing prices. The
other is that the experience premium increases, as the learning externality be-
comes stronger due to more skilled people in A. Eventually the crowding eﬀect
prevails and RIA −RIB decreases for hA close enough to one. In the proximity
of 0.5, though, it all depends on the strength of the externalities. In particular
for φ large enough the real income diﬀerentials (which is 0 in hA =0 .5) will be
increasing.
The suﬃcient condition to have a ”stable” equilibrium with agglomeration
is that ∂(RIA − RIB)/∂hA > 0 in the symmetric equilibrium hA =0 .5. If φ is
small then ∂(RIA −RIB)/∂hA < 0 holds globally and the symmetric dispersed
equilibrium is the only one possible. Therefore, if the function (RIA − RIB)
is monotone in hA, only one equilibrium exists, and it is the symmetric one.
If ∂(RIA − RIB)/∂hA is positive then the symmetric equilibrium would be
unstable and there would be two stable equilibria on its sides. This type of
behavior is known as ”bifurcation of equilibrium”: passing a threshold value
of φ, the dynamic behavior of the system changes. In this case we are in the
presence of a so-called ”pitchfork” bifurcation (as deﬁned in Fujita et al. [12]
Chapter 3 Appendix A). The symmetric stable equilibrium become unstable
and two stable asymmetric equilibria arise. These equilibria become more and
more distant as the value of the parameter increases.
The concept of ”stability” used here is the usual ”evolutionary stability”
used in Economic Geography and described in Fujita et al [12] Section 1.3:
A certain distribution of skills (hA > 0.5,h B < 0.5) is stable if real lifetime
income is equated in the two locations and by increasing the share of skilled
workers in A, the lifetime income of those workers becomes lower than in B,
while decreasing this share it becomes higher. In this case we have an interior
solution with skilled workers in both locations. If such an interior equilibrium
does not exist, then the solution is a corner one, given that the lifetime income
in the location with all workers is larger than the potential lifetime income in
18the other location.
As φ increases the equilibrium moves, from the symmetric one towards one
with larger and larger concentration of skills and workers in location A.S u c h
an equilibrium is also sub-game perfect and evolutionary stable. The three
ﬁgures B1, B2 and B3 below show the function RIA − RIB for hA ∈ [0.5,1]
and identify the equilibrium, for three values (low in ﬁgure B1, intermediate in
ﬁgure B2 and high in ﬁgure B3) of φ. The values of the other parameters are
as follows: γ =0 .75 is chosen to have elasticity of substitution between high
and low educated equal to 4, Λ =1 .55 is chosen to match the average college
premium, δ =0 .75 gives a share of expenditure in housing of families equal to
0.25. α1 =0 .4, α2 =0 .3, α3 =0 .2 are parameter values which captures the
larger contribution to the externality of educated people and, among them, of
young people22. For these values of the parameters the equilibrium without
migration can be sustained for large values of the speciﬁcity of human capital:
θ 1 0.65. The value θ =0 .65 is the value that satisﬁes conditions (18) with
equality. Below it the equilibrium without migration cannot be sustained. The
increasing strength of the externality (φ) leads to increasingly agglomerated
equilibria. Progressively the experience premium increases in the dense location
and decreases in the less dense location. As long as the transferability of human
capital is low, increased learning generates increase premia and larger lifetime
income in both cities. We consider large value of φ as our starting point, as
cities have been for a while concentration of skills.
Figure B1: φ =1 , Low Externalities: Equilibrium without Migration
22Several other simulations and robustness checks have been performed with diﬀerent values
of the parameter. They are available upon request. Their qualitative features are identical to
those of the simulation reported in the paper.
19Figure B2: φ =1 .3, Intermediate Externalities: Equilibrium without
Migration.
Figure B3: φ =1 .5, Large externalities: Equilibrium without Migration.
For φ large (= 1.5i no u rc a s e )a sθ decreases, the equilibrium without
migration violates, at θ < 0.65, condition 18. At this point it is convenient for
workers who have accumulated eﬀectiveness in location A to move to location
B, when old, to take advantage of the higher wages for skilled and lower prices.
The equilibrium without migration ceases to be sub-game perfect. The new
20equilibrium satisﬁes condition (19). It turns out that, imposing condition (19)






(RIA − RIB) is strictly increasing and it is positive in hA =1 24. In this case
the corner solution is the only possible equilibrium. Therefore, the only stable
equilibrium is the corner allocation, with all young workers in A , while the
number of old workers in A, and therefore the number of migrants (hY
A − hO
A),
is determined to satisfy (19) and is strictly smaller than one. The three ﬁgures
below show the lifetime income diﬀerential between A and B and the number of
migrants in the relevant interval in which Migrants= hY
A − hO
A > 0. Outside of
this interval we cannot have a sub-game perfect equilibrium and sometimes the
solution to the conditions (6), (7), (17) and (19), for given hY
A yields negative
interest rates or negative hO
A. Keeping φ =1 .5 we allow transferability of human
capital to increase from its critical value θ =0 .65 (ﬁgure B4).to θ =0 .4( ﬁgure
B5) and then to θ =0 .1. (ﬁgure B6). The only sub-game perfect, evolutionarily
stable equilibrium for each case is the one in which all young workers are in
A and part of them move to B when old in order to satisfy condition (19).
The number of migrants in equilibrium increases as the transferability of skills
increases.
Figure B4: θ =0 .65, critical value.
23Recall that this is a necessary condition for the solution.
24The proof is available upon request and requires the condition α1 > α2.
21Figure B5: θ =0 .4,high transferrability of human capital
Figure B6: θ =0 .1, very high transferrability of human capital
Summarizing brieﬂy the qualitative results, when the intensity of learning
from others (φ) is low, the economy exhibits only the symmetric equilibrium.
As φ increases, while transferability of skills is still low, agglomeration equilib-
ria arise. Location A becomes the concentration of high skilled workers and
promotes large acquisition of skills. As transferability increases (θ decreases)
migration arises as the only possible equilibrium: the static sub-game perfect
equilibrium has all young in city A and some of them moving out of it once old,
to take advantage of less competition and less crowding in the other city.
22Figure 1: Figure C1: Share of Educated Workers as a function of φ
5.2 Simulation: transferability and intensity of learning
In this section we analyze more systematically the eﬀect on equilibrium density,
wages and income in city A and B as φ and θ vary . We describe brieﬂyt h e
eﬀects of increase in φ, the importance of face-to-face interactions for learning,
assuming that our starting point is a situation where θ is large. More time is
spent on the analysis of the equilibria as a function of θ, which is the novel
feature of our model. We simulate the equilibria as transferability increase for
high values of learning intensity.
If we represent in a diagram the evolution of the share of skilled workers in
city A as the intensity of learning from interactions (φ) increases we obtain a
classic example of pitchfork bifurcation. Figure C1 is obtained for the values
of the parameters described in Section 5.1, θ ≥ 0.65 as φ increases. It shows
that as φ increases over the critical value of 1.22, two potential equilibria with
agglomeration arise. One of the two equilibria has location A become the lo-
cation where most educated workers concentrate, while the symmetric one has
city B becoming crowded with educated workers . Considering the equilibrium
in which city A attracts educated workers, we have eA >e B,a n dt h ee x p e r i -
ence premium in A become larger as the density increases. Real wage of young,
though, is larger in city B where lower density increases productivity of edu-
cated and decreases housing prices. Real wage of old workers, is larger in A,a s
a result of the large accumulation of eﬀectiveness during the ﬁrst period. This
is illustrated in ﬁgure C2 that shows the evolution of real wages in equilibrium
as φ increases. Real lifetime income of workers is equal in the two cities, as
workers are free to move at the beginning of their career and chose to move up
23to the point in which lifetime incomes are equalized. Workers in A are willing
to forego higher wages when young, in order to accumulate larger amount of
skills and have larger wage as old.
Figure C2: Real wages as a function of φ
This type of equilibrium, explains the large experience premium in cities, as
well as their high density of educated workers but does not generate a larger
fraction of young workers among the educated in city A. This situation, in which
agglomeration economies are at work and cities are concentration of skills is the
departure point of our analysis. Namely such was the situation in the 60’s. The
introduction of more standardized techniques, the increase in transferability of
skills, the ”globalization” of the technical languages promoted the potential for
migration with small loss of speciﬁc human capital. We represent in ﬁgure
C3 below the evolution of educated workers’ location as speciﬁcity of skills
decreases from θ =1t oθ =0 .
24Figure C3: Share of educated workers as a function of θ.
The ﬁgure shows that, from the equilibrium without migration and with
concentration of educated workers in A,a sθ drops below 0.65 (which is the
critical value for which 18 holds with equality) a unique stable equilibrium with
migration arises. All young educated workers move to A , while some of them
move out of A, once old in order to satisfy condition 19. People who migrate
from A to B, at the end of their youth, are just enough as to equate the real
wage of old educated workers who move to the real wage of those who stay. In
this equilibrium, old workers in B earn as much as the old in A,b u ti fs o m e
young were to be in B they would earn much less as they would not accumulate
any skills due to the complete absence of young workers. While skilled old
workers are people who started in A and therefore get the same real wage as in
A, unskilled in B are paid less than in A. Figure C4 shows the real wages earned
by young and old people in A and B. For values of θ smaller than 0.65 the ﬁgure
shows the initial widening of the experience premium. The real wage of young
in B is always larger than for young in A,b u tt h eg a i ni ns k i l l sf r o mb e i n g
in A generate full concentration of young there. As transferability increases (θ
decreases) the experience premium in A as well as the real wage of old skilled
workers in A decreases. This is due to the fact that, as a larger and larger share
of old skilled move to B this harms the accumulation of skills in location A.
At the point of perfect transferability of skills (θ = 0) city A is almost only
populated with young educated and this decreases the possibility of learning
(which in our example depends on the presence of all groups of skills).
25Figure C4: Real Wages as functions of θ
The key insight of this simulation, though, is that passing the critical value
of θ the economy moves to a new equilibrium where:
• Experience premia are higher
• Denser cities attract Young educated workers while less dense cities attract
older workers.
• Educated workers move during their life, at the beginning of the second
period.
These three facts are consistent with what observed between the 60’s and
1990.
6 Discussion: Mobility and Speciﬁcity of Hu-
man Capital
The present paper concentrates on two important characteristics of skills, in
particular of those skills acquired during the working life of a person. The
ﬁrst is the possibility of accumulating them, through interactions with other
skilled workers in the local working environment. The second is the possibility
of transferring these skills, acquired in one location to another location. Only if
both aspects are present cities attract educated young in spite of paying them
low premia for living in an expensive environment. Workers are willing to give
up some of their real wage as young, to beneﬁt from the learning externality.
Once old, though, some leave the cities and take advantage of the acquired skills
in less dense and competitive locations.
26This simple model accounts for all the stylized facts described in section 2.
It also implies that the increased concentration of young skilled in dense areas
observed between 1970 and 1990 is the result of a shift in equilibrium. The
assumption needed for these results is that human capital speciﬁcity decreased
during that period and it was rather large before it. Moreover a further impli-
cation of our model is that in 1990 we should observe more mobility of educated
















Table 3: Mobility of college educated and high-school educated workers.
We discuss here some suggestive evidence on mobility of workers, and some
anecdotal evidence on speciﬁcity of skills and its decline. Table 3 shows the
percentage of white, male, single workers in the age range between 35 and
45 who moved across counties or states in the US. Our choice is meant to
control for family and cultural characteristics which could aﬀect the moving
decisions. Moreover we select the age group, likely to have already worked for
10-20 years, which corresponds to workers at the end of their ﬁrst period in
our model. We calculate these numbers from the PUMS 1990 and 1970 data
and we consider two groups: workers with college degree or more and high
school graduates. While we see mobility increasing from the 70’s to the 90’s
we clearly see that for educated workers the fraction of people moving in the
age range more than doubles, while for high school graduates increases by 25-
50%. Generic increased mobility would not produce the above results, what we
observe is higher mobility of highly educated, in a period of their life in which
they are likely to have already accumulated relevant working experience. This
is compatible with larger transferability of skills for educated workers in 1990
than in 1970.
Finally we want to convey some anecdotal evidence on skills’ speciﬁcity.
While hard to measure speciﬁcity of human capital can be inferred from the
loss in wage of workers who are displaced from their ﬁrm. The tenure premium
is a way to infer that. If a worker who moves out of a job for causes independent
from her will suﬀers a wage loss, the theory of human capital attributes it to
t h el o s so fs p e c i ﬁc capital. The existing measures, are for ﬁrm-speciﬁc( r a t h e r
27than city-speciﬁc) human capital, but they help us to have an idea of the size
of such speciﬁcity (parameter θ in the model), as ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
should be a lower bound of city-speciﬁc human capital.
Table4: Wage change of displaced workers
Years of Seniority on Prior Job 0-5 6-10 11-20 21+
Average percentage Change in Weekly wage -9.5% -22.3% -28.2% -43.9%
Return to Experience:0.07 Return to Tenure:0.06
Source: Topel [34], Table 1, Table 7
Workers January CPS 1984, 1986
Our Table 4 summarizes results taken from Table 1 and Table 7 in Topel
[34]. He uses US workers in 1984 and 1986 and shows that the loss in wage due
to displacement is both substantial and increasing with prior tenure. The loss in
productivity of a worker with 20 years of tenure if he is displaced is 44% of his
wage, a substantial fraction. In the same table we also report Topel’s estimate
of the yearly return to experience and the return to tenure. We can think that
the return to tenure relative to total return (tenure+experience) is the fraction
of speciﬁc capital accumulated θ. The estimates for such a ratio which could be
derived from Topel’s paper (see his Table 5 and 7) range from 0.40 to a 0.60.
These values are not too far from the 0.65 which is the critical value of θ in
our experiment. Similarly Neal [29] , using data for workers in 1984-86-88 and
90, ﬁnds that the loss from displacement after ten years of tenure is 27% larger
than after only one year of tenure. Again this denotes an estimate of speciﬁc
human capital which is substantial.
Organizational changes in the ’80s and 90’s (the personal computer was
introduced in 1980) have brought standardization of the software used in ac-
counting, managing, programming and this could have had an important eﬀect
on increased skills’ transferability. Moving from a ﬁrm to another must have
become easier, in terms of tasks and skills’s portability. It is fair to say, though,
that little is known on how human capital speciﬁcity: how it has changed with
technological evolution, how it depends on the skill-intensity of the job and
o t h e rf a c t s .G i v e nt h et h e o r yw eh a v ed e v e l o p e d ,t h o u g h ,t h ea n a l y s i so fs u c h
speciﬁcity and of the impact of information technology on it, is crucial to assess
the future of cities as location for educated young people.
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